Nobody has the list.
Copilot Studio here, an Agentforce flow there, an n8n automation built over a weekend, agents inside your SaaS vendors.
Every agent in your company, on every platform: seen, tested under attack, and proven to your auditors.
Live simulation with synthetic data: what an agent estate looks like once a validation has put it under control.
We don't replace your vendors' controls. We check they are set right across your whole estate, attack them, and give you the proof.
Copilot Studio here, an Agentforce flow there, an n8n automation built over a weekend, agents inside your SaaS vendors.
It acts with a user's or a service account's rights. An over-permissioned account makes an over-permissioned agent.
No console sees the others. The settings exist; someone has to set them, test them and prove them.
Hidden instructions in a document, a tool that changes after approval, a token scoped too wide.
The business wants the agent live. Security has no defensible answer, so the agent waits or ships unproven.
Your SOC and your auditor need proof they can check, not a vendor saying it is secure.
The full inventory, including the agents nobody registered.
Prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, over-wide permissions, unapproved egress. We test the settings, where agents actually fail.
Proof your auditors, customers and SOC can verify. Every block comes with a hardening change.
We map every agent to an identity (Entra Agent ID where available) and a named owner. Unregistered agents surface on day one.
What each agent reads, sends to the model and calls (MCP servers, APIs, sandboxes, cloud), checked on five axes.
Routine actions run within policy. Side-effect actions wait for a named approver. Anything outside the mandate is blocked, with the reason recorded.
Each decision is logged in a form an auditor can check. Each block comes with a fix: a scoped token, a pinned MCP version, a permission removed.
Every attack below is one we reproduce and block in our own lab, in public.
Instructions hidden in an email, a web page or a document the agent reads.
A tool description that changes after approval and redirects the agent.
Files or records sent to a destination nobody approved.
A token that reaches far more than the task needs.
An agent nobody registered, or an A2A request with no verifiable identity.
Agent-written code that reaches the network or the host.
A defensible answer before go-live: what it can reach, what it can do, what stops it.
Controls that don't slow every release, and a review path only for risky actions.
An independent validation your customers' security teams can file.
A fixed-scope validation of two to three weeks, run by a security engineer against the agent you are about to ship.
Today, a hands-on validation with a signed opinion. Next, the same checks running continuously across your whole agent estate, like the console above.
Tell us about one of them. We come back with a proposed scope and timeline.